

Message Text

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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS ITEM

DELIVER TO BREMER/GOMPERT FOR THE SECRETARY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF O'LEARY ARTICLE, WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS TUESDAY, JUNE 25.

QUOTE: A GROWING DISPUTE OVER THE SCOPE OF U.S. ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION APPARENTLY WILL BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER THE SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW.

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON, D-WASH., A KEY CONGRESSIONAL CRITIC OF ADMINISTRATION HANDLING OF THE STRATEGIC MISSILES AGREEMENT, DREW EVEN FURTHER APART YESTERDAY OVER WHETHER KISSINGER HAD MADE ANY "SECRET DEALS" ON MISSILES WITH THE SOVIETS.

BUT, AFTER JACKSON'S SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HAD QUESTIONED KISSINGER FOR MORE THAN THREE HOURS, THE DEMOCRATIC LAWMAKER ANNOUNCED A SUSPENSION OF HIS INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED SECRET AGREEMENTS UNTIL AFTER PRESIDENT NIXON AND KISSINGER HAVE COMPLETED THEIR SESSIONS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER LEONID I. BREZHNEV. THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY

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WAS TO LEAVE FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING TODAY AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL EARLY JULY.

JACKSON EARLIER HAD TOLD REPORTERS HE INTENDED TO RELEASE DOCUMENTS THIS MORNING THAT WOULD CORROBORATE HIS POSITION THAT SECRET AGREEMENTS WERE WITHHELD FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS EVEN THOUGH THEY ALTERED THE TERMS OF THE "SALT" INTERIM AGREEMENT. BUT AFTER THE CLOSED-DOOR QUESTIONING OF KISSINGER, JACKSON ANNOUNCED NO HEARINGS WOULD BE HELD WHILE THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE ARE AWAY AND THAT THE DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE RELEASED IN THEIR ABSENCE.

"IN THE INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRY," JACKSON TOLD NEWSMEN, "IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SECRETARY BE ABLE TO LEAVE HERE KNOWING THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SOME DIFFERENCES WE CAN STILL ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO STABILIZE WORLD PEACE. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO RELEASE THE DOCUMENTS NOW...."

KISSINGER ARRIVED AT THE CAPITOL FOR THE HEARING AND JOcularly ASKED A NEWSMAN, "WHERE ARE THE LIONS WAITING FOR ME?" WHEN HE EMERGED LATER, HE AGAIN DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY SECRET AGREEMENT OR ANY VIOLATION OF THE DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACT OF 1961.

"LOOK," KISSINGER TOLD A REPORTER, "ALL WE DID WAS CLARIFY AN AGREEMENT CONGRESS KNEW ALL ABOUT. AND IT IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE LAW TO CLARIFY AN UNDERSTANDING THAT INVOLVES SOVIET WEAPONS, ONLY IF IT WAS U.S. WEAPONS." AT A 70-MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER YESTERDAY, KISSINGER DENIED AS "TOTALLY FALSE IN EVERY DETAIL" PUBLISHED CHARGES THAT HE HAD MADE AGREEMENTS IN SECRET WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT GAVE THEM AN EDGE IN THE NUMBER OF MISSILES ALLOWED UNDER THE 1972 "SALT" AGREEMENT.

BUT KISSINGER DID DISCLOSE FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE RUSSIANS, AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES, SIGNED AN UNDERSTANDING IN MID-1972 WHICH CLARIFIED DETAILS OF HOW CERTAIN SUBMARINES COULD BE ARMED. HE ALSO DISCLOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT NIXON, ON THE LAST DAY OF THE
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1972 SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, HAD PERSONALLY TOLD SOVIET LEADERS THE UNITED STATES HAD NO INTENTION OF BUILDING AS MANY SUBMARINE MISSILE LAUNCHERS AS THE AGREEMENT ALLOWED BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT FELT THE RUSSIANS WOULD SOON FIND THAT OUT ANYHOW.

JACKSON, IN AN EARLY AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING KISSINGER'S, SAID HE HAD THE DOCUMENTS TO PROVE HIS CHARGE THAT THE SECRET CLARIFICATION OF JULY 24, 1972, WAS CLASSIFIED AS SECRET BY KISSINGER HIMSELF, WAS NEVER CONVEYED TO CONGRESS AND -- IN EFFECT -- AUTHORIZED THE

RUSSIANS TO INSTALL AN ADDITIONAL 70 MODERN MISSILES ON SOME OF THEIR SUBS. THIS, JACKSON DECLARED, RAISED THE NUMBER OF UP-TO-DATE SUBMARINE BALLISTIC MISSILES PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO 1,020 AND ALTERED THE TERMS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT -- SPECIFYING A CEILING OF 950 -- WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF CONGRESS.

KISSINGER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING SIGNED BY THE RUSSIANS WAS NOT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BUT INSISTED THAT AN INTERPRETATION OF IT WAS. HE SAID HE NEVER MADE CONCESSIONS THAT WERE NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD BY CONGRESS FROM THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT. JACKSON RETORTED THAT CONGRESS WAS NEVER INFORMED, THAT HE COULD PROVE IT AND THAT THE FIRST HE KNEW OF THE SECRET UNDERSTANDING WAS WHEN FORMER SALT NEGOTIATOR PAUL H. NITZE, SINCE RESIGNED, TESTIFIED BEFORE HIS COMMITTEE LAST THURSDAY.

"THE SECRET CLARIFICATION WAS NOT FORMALLY TRANSMITTED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT," JACKSON DECLARED, "FOR MORE THAN 11 MONTHS AFTER IT WAS AGREED TO ON JULY 24, 1972." HE SAID IT WAS KEPT SECRET AT THE REQUEST OF THE RUSSIANS BUT THAT IT WAS FROM THE RUSSIANS THAT NITZE HIMSELF HAD FIRST LEARNED OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

"THE WHOLE ISSUE WOULD NEVER HAVE COME UP IF THIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS," JACKSON DECLARED "IT'S THE AGE-OLD PROBLEM OF SECRECY. THE LAW REQUIRES THAT AGREEMENTS LIMITING THE ARMS OF THE U.S. BE APPROVED BY CONGRESS. THE SECRET CLARIFICATION, BY ALTERING THE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

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TERMS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, CLEARLY REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL."

EVEN THOUGH KISSINGER AND JACKSON EMERGED FROM YESTERDAY'S HEARING IN A STATE OF TRUCE, IT WAS APPARENT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION BEHIND CLOSED DOORS.

IN NITZE'S TESTIMONY LAST WEEK, DISCLOSED IN THE STAR-NEWS AND OTHER NEWSPAPERS LAST SATURDAY, THE FORMER ARMS NEGOTIATOR REPORTEDLY SAID THAT KISSINGER HAD MADE TWO "SECRET" DEALS WITH THE SOVIETS -- ONE TO HOLD THE U.S. SUBMARINE MISSILE STRENGTH BELOW THE CEILING SET IN THE AGREEMENT, AND THE OTHER TO LET THE SOVIET SUBMARINE MISSILE STRENGTH RISE ABOVE THEIR CEILING.

KISSINGER YESTERDAY DENIED THAT THERE WERE ANY SECRET DEALS AND HE ARGUED THAT THE SELF-IMPOSED LIMIT ON U.S. MISSILE STRENGTH WAS NO CONCESSION AND THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEING HELD TO THEIR CEILING.

THE JULY 1972, UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS, AS EXPLAINED BY KISSINGER, REVOLVED AROUND THE RUSSIANS; G-CLASS, DIESEL-POWERED SUBMARINE FLEET. WHEN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, THE SOVIETS WERE PERMITTED 950 BALLISTIC MISSILES ON NUCLEAR SUBMARINES AND COULD ACHIEVE THIS LIMIT ONLY BY REPLACING 210 OLDER MISSILES.

THE UNITED STATES, THE SECRETARY SAID, PREFERRED THAT THE 210 BE ICBM (INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES) OF THE SS7 AND SS8 TYPE WITH A 5,000-MILE RANGE AND SIX MEGATON WARHEADS. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES WANTED TO PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM TRADING IN MISSILES THEY WOULD HAVE HAD TO RETIRE ANYWAY, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM THE OBSOLETE G-CLASS SUBS WHICH CARRIED MISSILES WITH RANGES OF ONLY 700 MILES AND 300 MILES.

"IT SEEMED IMPROBABLE TO US THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD KEEP A MISSILE IT HAD TO CARRY 4,000 MILES TO FIRE 300 MILES AT THE U.S. WHEN IT HAD 1,400 ICBMS THAT COULD BE FIRED FROM THE SOVIET UNION," KISSINGER EXPLAINED.

"WE WANTED TO KEEP THEM FROM TRADING IN A WEAPON THEY
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WOULD HAVE TO TRADE IN ANYWAY."

THE G-CLASS SUBS ARE NOISY, VULNERABLE, EASILY DETECTED, CAN REMAIN SUBMERGED ONLY THREE DAYS AND HAVE TO SURFACE TO FIRE MISSILES, KISSINGER SAID. AS HE EXPLAINED IT, THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED IT A NEGOTIATING COUP THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF MISSILE STOCKS WOULD HAVE TO BE FROM THE ICBM ARSENAL INSTEAD OF THE OBSOLETE G-CLASS SUB FLEET. THEY COULD ONLY MODERNIZE THE G-CLASS FLEET AT EXPENSE OF THEIR OVERALL PERMITTED TOTAL AND, KISSINGER SAID, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABSURD FOR THE RUSSIANS TO BUILD A WHOLE NEW MISSILE FOR AN OUTDATED SUBMARINE.

KISSINGER SAID THAT ON JUNE 5, 1972, HE INFORMED A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, INCLUDING THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE. "TO REACH 950 MISSILES ON Y (YANKEE CLASS MODERN SUBS) CLASS SUBMARINES, THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE TO RETIRE SS7 AND SS8S. G-CLASS SUBS ARE OUTSIDE THE AGREEMENT UNLESS THEY ARE MODERNIZED." HE SAID THIS WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE JACKSON COMMITTEE IN JULY 1972.

BUT KISSINGER SAID THE SOVIETS DISPUTED THIS INTERPRETATION AND SAID THEY SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO TRADE IN THOSE G-CLASS MISSILES. A MONTH OF EXCHANGES ENSUED IN THAT PRE-ELECTION PERIOD AND KISSINGER SAID THE ADMINISTRATION WAS CONCERNED ABOUT LEAVING THE MATTER

HANGING FOR ANY SUCCESSOR U.S. GOVERNMENT ELECTED IN NOVEMBER.

FOR THAT REASON, HE SAID, "WE ASKED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO SIGN THE INTERPRETATIVE AGREEMENT THAT WE HAD MADE -- WHICH I WILL NOW READ -- AND IS ALMOST VERBATIM WHAT I HAD ALREADY SAID PUBLICLY AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE MAY 26, THE NIGHT THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED AND WHICH WE HAD TOLD EVERY AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE OUR PUBLIC POSITION."

THIS DOCUMENT, READ BY KISSINGER, SAID, "IN CLARIFICATION OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

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AGREEMENT..., THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT: ONE, THE AGGREGATE LEVEL OF BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON SUBMARINES ESTABLISHED FOR THE U.S. AND THE USSR, 950 FOR THE USSR AND 710 FOR THE U.S., INCLUDES BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON ALL NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES AND LAUNCHERS FOR MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH MAY BE DEPLOYED ON DIESEL-POWERED SUBMARINES. SECONDLY, LAUNCHERS FOR OLDER BALLISTIC MISSILES ON DIESEL-POWERED SUBMARINES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED LEVELS AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE USED FOR PURPOSES OF REPLACEMENT AS DEFINED IN THE PROTOCOL."

IN OTHER WORLDS, KISSINGER SAID, THEY HAD TO GET RID OF ICBMS. THE SECRET AGREEMENT, HE SAID, IS NO MORE THAN A STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN STATED PUBLICLY ON MAY 26, OF WHAT WAS TOLD TO THE U.S. BUREAUCRACY ON JUNE 5, OF WHAT HAD BEEN SENT OUT IN GUIDANCE TO EVERY AGENCY ON JUNE 15. HE SAID IT DOES NOT PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO BUILD ONE ADDITIONAL MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE ON SUBMARINES ABOVE THE LEVEL OF 950 THAT WAS AGREED ON.

ON THE OTHER ALLEGED SECRET AGREEMENT ABOUT SELF-IMPOSED U.S. LIMITATIONS ON ITS OWN SUBMARINE LEVELS, KISSINGER SAID THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO THE 1972 MOSCOW SUMMIT, THE NAVY AND THE JOINT CHIEFS HAD TOLD HIM THEY DID NOT WISH TO BUILD ANY MORE POSEIDON SUBMARINES BUT PREFERRED TO WAIT UNTIL 1977 FOR THE NEW ULMS, OR TRIDENT, SUBMARINE.

"WE KNEW WE HAD NO INTENTION OF BUILDING ANY ADDITIONAL SUBMARINES UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT," HE SAID. BUT THE UNITED STATES INSERTED A PROVISION IN THE INTERIM PACT PERMITTING THE UNITED STATES TO CONVERT 54 OLDER ICBMS TO SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES BECAUSE IT WAS THOUGHT UNWISE TO GIVE

THE SOVIETS A RIGHT TO CONVERT OLD MISSILES INTO SUBMARINE-
LAUNCHED MISSILES WITHOUT MAINTAINING A SIMILAR AMERICAN
RIGHT.

HE SAID PRESIDENT NIXON THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE ON THE
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LAST DAY OF THE 1972 SUMMIT TO TELL THE SOVIET UNION WHAT
WOULD BECOME APPARENT WITHIN A FEW WEEKS ANYWAY, NAMELY,
THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO INTENTION OF CONVERTING
TITAN LAND-BASED MISSILES TO SUBMARINE MISSILES DURING
THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

NONE OF THIS CHANGED THE TOTAL FIGURES, HE ADDED.

THE AGREEMENT MEANT THE UNITED STATES COULD MAINTAIN
1,054 ICBMS AND 656 SUBMARINE MISSILES. IT WAS NOT A
CONCESSION, HE SAID. IN EVERY PROJECTION TO CONGRESS, HE
SAID, WE HAVE SHOWN THAT WE PLANNED ON 41 SUBMARINES AND
1,054 MISSILES.

"TO SUM UP, THE TOTALS FOR THE SOVIET SIDE WHICH WERE
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS HAVE NOT BEEN CHANGED BY ANY
AGREEMENT, UNDERSTANDING OR CLARIFICATION, PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE," KISSINGER SAID. "THE TOTALS FOR THE U.S. THAT
WERE SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS HAVE NOT BEEN ALTERED BY
ANY AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE.

ALL THE DISPUTES HAVE ARISEN, HE SAID, OVER ESOTERIC
ASPECTS OF REPLACEMENT PROVISIONS AND NOT THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE AGREEMENTS.

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